【英语中国】何必讳言中国操纵汇率

The incumbent superpower has blinked in its confrontation with the rising one: the US Treasury has decided to postpone a report due by April 15 on whether China is an exchange-rate manipulator. Since a programme of multilateral and bilateral consultations is under way, it was right to give these discussions a chance before taking any action.

Is China a currency manipulator? Yes. China has intervened on a gigantic scale to keep its exchange rate down. Between January 2000 and the end of last year, China's foreign currency reserves rose by $2,240bn; after July 2008, when the renminbi's gradual appreciation against the dollar – begun three years earlier – halted, reserves rose by $600bn (see chart); and reserves are now close to 50 per cent of gross domestic product. Finally, a massive effort has been aimed at curbing the inflationary effects of intervention.

Thus, China has controlled the appreciation of both nominal and real exchange rates. This surely is currency manipulation. It is also protectionist, being equivalent to a uniform tariff and export subsidy. Premier Wen Jiabao has protested against “depreciating one's own currency, and attempting to pressure others to appreciate, for the purpose of increasing exports. In my view, that is protectionism”. The Chinese pot is calling the US kettle black.

Yet some economists deny this, offering four counter-arguments: first, while the intervention is huge, the distortion is small; second, the impact on the global balance of payments is modest; third, global “imbalances” do not matter; and, finally, the problem, albeit real, is being resolved. Let us consider each of these points in turn.

On the first, estimates of the extent of undervaluation vary hugely: some even argue the renminbi is overvalued. This is partly the result of contrasting methodologies – fundamental equilibrium exchange rates against purchasing power parity – and partly of different assumptions about the right starting point. If, for example, Chinese people were free to export their savings, the capital outflow might be even bigger than today's intervention. But if the world were free to buy Chinese assets, the capital inflow would explode, too. Who would not want a bit of the world's most dynamic economy?

Plausibly, the undervaluation is considerable, possibly as much as the “25 per cent on a trade-weighted basis and . . . 40 per cent against the dollar” suggested by Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The JPMorgan estimate of a trade- weighted real exchange rate is only 10 per cent above its average level since the beginning of 1994, even though China has been the world's fastest-growing economy over this period. It has also depreciated by 8 per cent since October 2008. This is surely peculiar.

On the second point, Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley has argued that differences in savings behaviour determine current account balances and the Chinese surplus cannot determine the US overall deficit.

I find neither argument persuasive. If the Chinese currency influences the dollar exchange rates of China's competitors, as it surely does, it will definitely affect multilateral balances. Furthermore, one of the points I made in my (recently updated) book, Fixing Global Finance, is that real exchange rates also determine savings rates, not just the other way round. This is because governments care about GDP. The undervalued Chinese real exchange rate generated a contribution of net exports of 5.6 per cent of GDP between 2006 and 2008. The Chinese authorities had no reason to try to lower the surplus of savings at that time: it went into net exports. But when net exports plunged in 2009, knocking 3.9 points off GDP, the Chinese authorities acted to lower the savings surplus, by expanding domestic credit and promoting investment (see charts).

Mr Roach also points to today's negligible net US savings. But this, too, is the result of a fiscal offset to a surge in private sector savings surpluses. Why was this needed? The answer is that, with a huge structural current account deficit, a rise in private savings in the US would otherwise have created a depression. In sum, savings surpluses are a policy variable, not a given.

On the third point, yes, imbalances do matter. This was partly because of the form they took. As Anton Brender and Florence Pisani argue in a brilliant study for the Centre for European Policy Studies, the salient characteristic of the capital outflow from emerging economies was that it came in the form of reserves – an overall increase of close to $6,000bn in the noughties.* This led to huge increases in demand for liquid and safe assets. Our cunning financial sector fabricated such assets wholesale, from those “subprime” ingredients, with results we now see.

Imbalances also matter because they will have a big impact on the recovery. As Mark Carney, governor of the Bank of Canada, pointed out in a recent speech, should imbalances persist, two outcomes are conceivable: either countries with big external deficits continue with their huge fiscal deficits, until “global interest rates begin to rise, crowding out private investment and ultimately lowering potential growth”; or the deficit countries start to reduce the fiscal deficits sharply, without any offsetting changes in surplus countries, in which case there is “deficient demand globally”.

On the fourth point, Jim O'Neill, chief economist of Goldman Sachs, argues that the Chinese surplus is ceasing to be a significant factor. It is true that it has halved, as a share of GDP, since 2007. The question is whether this shift is structural or the result of exceptional and temporary measures. The World Bank still expects China's current account to stabilise at high levels, with net exports about to make a positive contribution to growth. The world's fastest-growing economy would be exporting unemployment. Mr O'Neill is ahead of himself.

I conclude that the renminbi is undervalued, that this is dangerous for the durability of global recovery and that China's actions have not, so far, provided a durable solution. I conclude, too, that rebalancing is a necessary condition for sustainable recovery, changes in competitiveness are a necessary condition for rebalancing, real renminbi appreciation is necessary for changes in competitiveness, and a rise in the currency is necessary for real appreciation, given the Chinese desire to curb inflation.

The US was right to give talking a chance. But talk must lead to action.

* Global Imbalances and the Collapse of Globalised Finance, CEPS, 2010

在与正在崛起的强国的对峙中，现今的超级大国首先眨眼：美国财政部决定，推迟原定于4月15日发布的有关中国是否是汇率操纵国的报告。鉴于两国已启动了多边和双边磋商计划，在采取任何行动前给这些讨论一个机会是对的。

中国是汇率操纵国吗？是的。中国为了将汇率保持在较低水平，进行了大规模的干预。2000年1月至去年底之间，中国外汇储备增长2.24万亿美元；2008年7月，人民币兑美元逐步升值的步伐（始于3年前）停止了，此后，外汇储备增加了6000亿美元；目前，中国外汇储备已接近国内生产总值(GDP)的50%。中国政府付出巨大努力，以求遏制干预的通胀效应。

中国就这样一直抑制名义和实际汇率的升值。这当然是操纵汇率，同时也是一种保护主义，相当于一种统一关税和出口补贴。中国总理温家宝抗议某些国家“贬低本国的币值，反过来又企图用施压的办法来强迫别国的货币升值。我以为这种做法是一种贸易保护主义的做法”。这是以五十步笑百步。

但有一些经济学家否认这一点，提出了四个反对理由：首先，尽管中国干预的规模很大，但汇率扭曲的程度并不严重；其次，汇率扭曲对全球收支平衡的影响有限；第三，全球“失衡”问题并不要紧；最后，尽管问题切实存在，但正得到解决。那就让我们依次分析一下这几点。

首先，人们对于人民币低估程度的估算大相径庭：一些人甚至宣称，人民币高估了。这部分是由于各方采用的方法不同——基本均衡汇率相对于购买力平价(PPP)，而部分是由于各方对正确起点的假设不同。例如，如果中国人可自由出口储蓄，那么中国资金外流的情况可能会比目前的政府干预还要严重。但如果外部世界可自由购置中国资产，那么资金流入也会激增。谁不想从全球最具活力的经济体中分得一杯羹呢？

比较可信的是，人民币显著低估了。彼得森国际经济研究所(Peterson Institute for International Economics)所长弗雷德?伯格斯滕(Fred Bergsten)提出，人民币贸易加权汇率和兑美元汇率偏低的程度可能分别高达25%和40%。据摩根大通(JPMorgan)估计，中国目前的贸易加权实际汇率仅高出1994年初以来平均水平10%，尽管中国在这段时期一直是全球增长最迅速的经济体。自2008年10月以来，贸易加权实际汇率甚至还贬值了8%。这肯定是反常的。

关于第二点，摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)的史蒂芬?罗奇(Stephen Roach)主张，储蓄行为的不同决定了经常账户差额，而中国的盈余并不是美国总体赤字的决定因素。

我认为这两个论点都不具说服力。如果人民币影响了与中国竞争的其它国家货币兑美元的汇率（事实的确如此），那肯定会影响多边平衡。此外，我在（最近修订的）《理顺全球财务》(Fixing Global Finance)一书中提出的观点之一就是：实际汇率不仅仅受储蓄率决定，它也决定着后者。这是因为各国政府都很在乎GDP。2006年至2008年间，人民币实际汇率低估所贡献的净出口，相当于GDP的5.6%。在此期间，中国当局没有理由去减少储蓄盈余：它都流入了净出口。但当2009年净出口骤降（导致GDP损失3.9%）时，中国当局就开始采取行动，通过扩张国内信贷和加大投资，来减少储蓄盈余。

罗奇还将矛头指向了目前美国可忽略不计的净储蓄。但这同样是财政状况抵消私人部门储蓄盈余激增的结果。为什么要这样？答案在于，有如此庞大的结构性经常账户赤字，如果美国私人储蓄增长，那将会导致经济萧条。总而言之，储蓄盈余是一个政策变量，而非既定事实。

关于第三点，事实是，失衡问题很重要。这在一定程度上是由于失衡的形式。安东?布朗代(Anton Brender)和弗洛伦斯?皮萨尼(Florence Pisani)为欧洲政策研究中心(Centre for European Policy Studies)完成了一份极其出色的研究报告。他们在报告中指出，新兴经济体资本外流的显著特征是，资金是以外汇储备的形式流出的——过去十年，新兴经济体外汇储备总额增长了近6万亿美元。*这导致了对流动及安全资产的需求大增。狡猾的西方金融业用那些“次级”材料批量生产此类资产，后果现在大家都知道了。

失衡问题很重要，还因为这会给经济复苏带来严重影响。正如加拿大央行(Bank of Canada)行长马克?卡尼(Mark Carney)最近在一次演讲中所指出的，如果失衡持续存在，可想象会出现两种结果：要么是拥有巨额外部赤字的国家继续维持其巨额财政赤字，直到“全球利率开始上升，由此将私人投资排挤出去，并最终降低潜在增长率”；要么是在盈余国尚未做出任何抵消性变化之时，赤字国开始大幅削减财政赤字——在这种情况下，“全球将面临需求不足的问题”。

关于第四点，高盛(Goldman Sachs)首席经济学家吉姆?奥尼尔(Jim O'neill)辩称，中国的盈余不再是一个重要因素。的确，2007年以来，中国的盈余在GDP中所占比例已经减半。但问题在于，这种转变是结构性的，还是只是特殊和临时措施的结果。世界银行(World Bank)仍预计中国的经常账户会稳定在高位，净出口会对增长做出正面贡献。这个全球增长最快的经济体将输出失业。奥尼尔言之过早了。

我的结论是：人民币被低估了，这对全球复苏的持久性是危险的，而中国的所作所为迄今尚未给出一个持久的解决方案。我还得出结论认为：再平衡是可持续复苏的必要条件，竞争力的改变是再平衡的必要条件，人民币实际汇率升值是竞争力改变的必要条件，而让人民币升值是实际汇率升值的必要条件（既然中国政府有意抑制通胀）。

美国给讨论一个机会的做法是对的，但讨论之后必须拿出行动。

* 《全球失衡与全球化金融的崩溃》(Global Imbalances and the Collapse of Globalised Finance)，欧洲政策研究中心，2010年

译者/陈云飞