【英语中国】中国需要重新平衡经济增长

What is the most important high-level dialogue in international economics? The answer is not the discussion among the finance ministers of the Group of Seven high-income countries. It is the “strategic dialogue” between China and the US. This is not because the latter will produce answers, but because it asks the right question. The biggest challenge in international economic policymaking is the incorporation of China. This, to his credit, Hank Paulson, the US Treasury secretary, has recognised. But his bilateral approach will fail. The G7 should, instead, be replaced by a multilateral body that can address such issues more effectively.

To understand the challenge, we must appreciate what makes China's impact special. Experts often describe today's globalisation as the “second globalisation”, to distinguish it from the “first globalisation” between 1870 and 1914. In the earlier era the rising economic power was the US and the UK was by far the world's most important exporter of capital. But China is now emerging as both the world's most dynamic economy and its largest source of capital. This helps explain a signal feature of our era: the combination of rapid growth with low real interest rates.

China's current account surplus has exploded in recent years from a modest $46bn in 2003 to $250bn last year. This puts Japan's $170bn surplus of 2006 in the shade. China's current account surplus last year was 9.5 per cent of gross domestic product, more than double the highest ratio Japan has ever achieved, 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1986. If one adds the balance on flows of long-term capital (net foreign direct investment), the surplus in China's “basic balance of payments” reached 12 per cent of GDP last year.

To put this in historical context, UK net foreign investment was 8 per cent of gross national product between 1905 and 1914. What makes China's position even more extraordinary is that gross domestic investment itself appears to be more than 40 per cent of GDP. Thus China both is the world's largest exporter of capital and has the world's highest ratio of domestic investment to GDP. This is capital accumulation on a grand scale.

Yet the tale does not end there. In China's case the government has been the direct source of the capital outflow. This has been a by-product of its interventions in the currency market aimed at keeping the renminbi down against the US dollar. Thus, between 2003 and 2006 the country had a cumulative current account surplus of $525bn, together with a $228bn net inflow of FDI. These were almost perfectly offset by its $777bn accumulation of official foreign exchange reserves. By March of this year, the reserves had reached $1,202bn, the biggest in the world and more than two-fifths of China's GDP.

The reserve accumulations are not, it should be stressed, in response to inflows of speculative “hot money”. They reflect a policy of shipping out the foreign exchange received from huge trade surpluses and inflows of long-term investment, to keep the exchange rate down (see charts).

Is this behaviour desirable and, if not, what should be done about it?

A good argument can be made for the proposition that this pattern of behaviour is indeed desirable. It is desirable for the rest of the world because it lowers real interest rates, thereby allowing more spending. It is desirable for China, some economists also argue, because rapid export growth is the best way to generate sustainable economic expansion and higher employment.

The arguments against the pattern, however, are also strong, in my view stronger. So long as the counterpart trade deficits are concentrated in the US, there is a risk of protectionist action, particularly as the latter's economy slows down. More important, it is hard to believe that vast accumulations of low-yielding foreign assets, so vulnerable to the almost inevitable appreciation of the renminbi against the dollar, make sense for the Chinese themselves. Indeed, the Chinese leadership itself has repeatedly declared its intention to rebalance growth, which has depended unduly in recent years on the growth of investment and the external surplus. Over the past two years, the expansion in net exports generated close to a quarter of the growth of GDP. This cannot continue much longer. At some point rather soon, demand has to grow at least as fast as GDP, if not rather faster.

In a thought-provoking recent paper*, Nicholas Lardy of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington argues that the present development path has many evident disadvantages for China itself: household consumption is too low, at a mere 38 per cent of GDP in 2005; growth is too dominated by the coastal regions; employment growth ran at only 1 per cent a year between 1993 and 2004; energy consumption is too high; and the low domestic interest rates that result, in part, from foreign currency interventions distort the financial system and encourage wasteful investment.

So what is to be done? The answer seems simple: save less and let the nominal exchange rate appreciate faster, to eliminate possible inflationary consequences of such a policy shift. The Chinese government can easily afford to spend more on health and education. It can also usefully set up a modest pension system for those now alive. Moreover, the bulk of Chinese savings are not by households but by the government and corporations, many of which are owned by the government itself (see chart). Savings then are a policy choice, not a given. At 50 per cent of GDP, they also look far too high.

How then, if at all, can the outside world cajole China in a direction that seems to make such sense for the Chinese themselves? Mr Paulson is quite right to approach this question as a discussion of mutual interests. But it is almost inconceivable that the Chinese will grant what will appear to be one-sided concessions to demands from the “sole superpower”. That would be far too humiliating.

The Chinese will need, instead, to participate as equals in a wider global dialogue among the leading economic players. The obvious move is to replace the G7 with a group of four – the US, eurozone, Japan and China. In time, no doubt, India will join, but its time has not yet come. Such a grouping, moreover, should not focus on China alone. It must consider the range of policies adopted in these four dominant economies. Mr Paulson is indeed addressing many of the right questions, but in too narrow a forum. It is time to broaden the dialogue.

*China: Rebalancing Economic Growth, www.petersoninstitute.org

在国际经济中最重要的高层对话是什么？答案不是七国集团(G7)高收入国家财政部长间的磋商。而是中美之间的“战略对话”。这不是因为后者能给出答案，而是因为它提出了正确的问题。国际经济决策中面临的最大挑战是纳入中国。值得肯定的是，美国财政部长汉克•保尔森(Hank Paulson)认识到了这一点。但他的双边方式将归于失败。相反，七国集团应由一个能更有效地解决这类问题的多边机构所取代。“第二次全球化”

要理解这个挑战，我们必须意识到是什么促使中国的影响变得特别。专家们常常将今天的全球化描述为“第二次全球化”，以便与1870至1914年之间的“第一次全球化”相区别。在第一次全球化中，崛起的经济大国是美国，而英国是当时全球最重要的资本输出国。但现在，中国既是全球最具活力的经济体，也是最大的资本来源国。这有助于解释我们这个时代的一个特征：快速发展与低实际利率相结合。

近年来，中国经常账户盈余呈现爆炸式增长，从2003年的460亿美元，增至去年的2500亿美元，使得日本2006年1700亿美元的盈余相形见绌。中国去年的经常账户盈余是国内生产总值(GDP)的9.5%，是日本历史上最高比率（1986年，占GDP的4.3%）的两倍还多。如果加上长期资本流结余（净外国直接投资），去年中国的“基本收支”盈余达到GDP的12%。

将其置于历史背景下，英国1905至1914年的净外国直接投资占国民生产总值(GNP)的8%。令中国的地位更加不同寻常的是，中国国内投资总额本身似乎就占到GDP的40%以上。因此，中国既是全球最大的资本输出国，也是全球国内投资占GDP比率最高的国家。这是宏大规模的资本积累。

然而故事并没有到此为止。在中国，政府一直是资本流出的直接来源。这是中国干预外汇市场、将人民币兑美元汇率保持在低水平的副产品。因此，在2003至2006年之间，中国累积经常账户盈余达到5250亿美元，另外还有2280亿美元的外国直接投资净流入。这几乎正好为7770亿美元的官方外汇储备积累所抵消。到今年3月，中国外汇储备达到1.202万亿美元，规模为全球最大，超过中国GDP的五分之二。

应该强调的是，储备积累不是对投机性“热钱”流入的回应。相反，它们体现了这样的政策：输出从巨额贸易顺差和长期投资流入得到的外汇，以便将汇率维持在低水平（见图表）。

这种做法可取吗？如果不可取，应该做些什么？

累积大量储备，明智吗？

有很好的论点可以支持这种做法确实可取。它对全球其它地区是可取的，因为它压低了实际利率，从而扩大了支出。一些经济学家还指出，它对中国也是可取的，因为出口快速增长是实现可持续经济发展和扩大就业的最佳途径。

然而，反对这种做法的理由也很充分，在我看来，甚至更为充分。只要对方的贸易逆差集中在美国身上，就可能产生保护主义行为，尤其是在美国经济放缓之时。更重要的是，低收益率资产如此容易受到人民币兑美元几乎不可避免的升值的冲击，因此人们难以相信，大量积累这类资产对中国是有意义的。实际上，中国领导人自己也曾多次宣称有意重新平衡经济增长。近年来，中国的经济增长过度依赖于投资增长和外部盈余。过去两年，中国GDP的增长有近四分之一来自净出口的增长。这不可能再持续很长时间。在不久的某一时点，需求必须至少赶上GDP的增长步伐，如果不是增长得更快的话。

中国经济模式的许多弱点

在最近一份发人深省的文章*中，华盛顿国际经济研究所(Institute for International Economics)的尼古拉斯•拉迪(Nicholas Lardy)指出，对中国自身而言，当前的发展道路存在许多明显的弱点：家庭消费水平过低，2005年仅占GDP的38%；增长过度依赖于沿海地区；1993至2004年，每年的就业增长率仅为1%；能源消耗过高；低水平的国内利率（在一定程度上源自外汇干预）扭曲了金融体系并刺激了浪费性投资。

那么该做些什么呢？答案似乎很简单：减少储蓄，让名义汇率更快上升，以消除这种政策转变可能带来的通胀后果。中国政府可以轻松承受加大医疗和教育支出的负担。它还可以建立一个有用、适当的全民养老金体系。此外，中国很大一部分储蓄并非居民储蓄，而是政府和企业储蓄，其中许多企业由政府拥有（见图表）。因此，储蓄是一项政策选择，而非必然。中国储蓄占GDP的比例为50%，这也太高了。

那么，如果可以的话，外部世界如何才能劝说中国向一个似乎对中国人很明智的方向走呢？保尔森把这一问题当作共同利益来讨论，是很正确的。但是，中国政府对这个“唯一超级大国”的要求作出似乎是单方面的让步，几乎是不可想象的。这太丢脸了。

相反，中国政府需要以平等的地位加入到主要经济体更广泛的全球对话中。一个明显的行动就是用四方集团——美国、欧元区、日本和中国——取代七国集团。毫无疑问，印度最终也会加入，但目前还不是时候。另外，这样一个集团不应仅关注中国。它必须考虑这四个主要经济体采用的各项政策。保尔森确实是在应对许多正确的问题，但论坛过于狭窄。现在是扩大对话的时候了。

*中国：重新均衡经济增长(China: Rebalancing Economic Growth)，www.petersoninstitute.org

译者/何黎