【英语中国】谁能喂饱能源饥渴的中国？<br>(FT2007中国报告之二十六)

“The increase in China's energy demand between 2002 and 2005 was equivalent to Japan's current annual energy use.” This nugget of information, buried in the International Energy Agency's latest World Energy Outlook, tells one almost all one needs to know about what is happening to the world's energy economy. Neoclassical economics analysed economic growth in terms of capital, labour and technical progress. But, I now think, it is more enlightening to view the fundamental drivers as energy and ideas. Institutions and incentives provide the framework within which the development and application of useful knowledge transforms the fossilised sunlight on which we depend into the stream of goods and services we enjoy.

This is the world of abundance that China and India are now joining. Nothing short of a catastrophe will stop them. For the pessimists, however, particularly climate-change pessimists, catastrophe will follow. What is certain is that the challenges ahead are huge.

Here, then, are the highlights of the new report.

First, if governments stick with current policies (which the IEA calls the “reference scenario”), the world's energy needs will be more than
50 per cent higher in 2030 than today, with developing countries accounting for 74 per cent, and China and
India alone for 45 per cent, of the growth in demand.

Second, this huge increase in overall demand occurs even though energy intensity of gross world product falls at a rate of 1.8 per cent a year.

Third, fossil fuels are forecast to account for 84 per cent of the increase in global energy consumption between 2005 and 2030.

Fourth, world oil resources are, insists the IEA, sufficient to meet demand at prices close to $60 a barrel (in 2006 dollars). But the share of world supply coming from members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries will rise from 42 per cent to 52 per cent. Moreover, “a supply-side crunch in the period to 2015, involving an abrupt escalation in oil prices cannot be ruled out”.

Fifth, coal's share in global commercial energy is forecast to rise from 25 per cent to 28 per cent between 2005 and 2030, because of its role in power generation. China and India already account for 45 per cent of world coal use and drive over four-fifths of the increase under the “reference scenario”.

Sixth, some $22,000bn (a little under half of 2006 world gross product) will need to be invested in supply infrastructure, to meet demand over the next quarter century.

Seventh, even with radical measures to reduce the energy intensity of growth under the “alternative policy scenario”, global primary energy demand would grow at 1.3 per cent a year, only 0.5 percentage points a year less than in the “reference scenario”.

Eighth, China will become the world's largest energy consumer, ahead of the US, shortly after 2010.

Ninth, under the reference scenario, emissions of carbon dioxide will jump by 57 per cent between 2005 and 2030. The US, China, Russia and India alone contribute two-thirds of this increase. China becomes the world's biggest emitter this year and India the third largest by 2015.

Tenth, even under the IEA's more radical “alternative policy scenario” CO2 emissions stabilise only by 2025 and remain almost 30 per cent above 2005 levels.

The rest of the world, then,
wishes to enjoy the energy-intensive lifestyles that have, hitherto, been the privilege of less than a sixth of humanity. This desire does, however, have big consequences for the
world's economic, strategic and environmental future.

The obvious economic question concerns future prices. Today, the price of oil, deflated by the unit value of exports from the high-income countries, is higher than it has been since the beginning of the 20th century. Barring big technological breakthroughs in energy supply or unexpectedly large finds of oil and gas, energy would seem likely to remain relatively expensive.

Yet, to many, a surprise of the 1980s was how much supply finally came on stream and how low demand growth became after the price shocks of the 1970s. Might such an adjustment happen again and, if so, how quickly? Or should we regard the combination of fast-growing giant emerging economies and the dominance of national energy suppliers as fundamentally different?

The big strategic questions concern energy security and the shift in the balance of power towards unattractive regimes, be they Vladimir Putin's Russia, Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's Iran or the House of Saud's Arabia.

The shift in the balance of power occurs in two ways: first, a growing proportion of the fuels vital for what we now think of as civilised life come from just a few, not necessarily friendly, suppliers; second, these countries are becoming vastly richer. Thus, Opec revenues are forecast to triple (admittedly, in depreciating dollars) between 2002 and this year.

The challenge to security comes partly from the difficulty of replacing oil as a transport fuel. Thus, the concentration of likely supply in the Middle East is, inevitably, a concern. So, too, is Europe's growing reliance on Russian gas.

Concerns over energy security also come from the potential for competition for supplies among the big consumers. The sensible approach is to rely on the market. But that may be hard when prices shoot up. At some point, American politicians may ask why the US expends blood and treasure in order to achieve security in the Middle East for the benefit of China. True imperialism – the attempt to seize energy resources for one's own benefit – would be a ghastly error. But to err is all too human.

Finally, we have global warming. Three points shine out on this. First, despite the blather, nothing effective has been done or yet seems likely to be done. Second, effective policy will require big changes in incentives across the globe, including, not least, in the large emerging economies. Third, dramatic changes in technology will also be required, the most important of which will be towards carbon-capture-and-storage at coal-fired power plants.

What is the bottom line? It is simple: commercial energy is the staff of our contemporary life. As demand for energy rises, nothing is more important than ensuring increased supply and efficient use, while curbing environmental damage. Today's high prices are a start. Fundamental innovation and high prices on greenhouse gas emissions must follow

“中国2002年到2005年之间的能源需求增量，相当于日本目前全年的能源消耗量。”对于那些想知道世界能源经济正在如何演变的人们来说，国际能源署(IEA)最新一期《世界能源展望》(World Energy Outlook)中藏着的这个珍贵信息几乎说明了一切。新古典主义经济学(Neoclassical economics)通过资本、劳动力和技术进步来分析经济增长。不过，我现在觉得，把能源和创意视为基本驱动力反而更具启发性。机构和奖励机制提供了一个参照框架，在这个框架里，有用知识的开发和应用，把我们依赖的化石能源转变成我们所享受的源源不断的产品和服务。

这就是中国和印度目前正在加入的丰富世界。除非天降大祸，否则什么也挡不住它们。不过，对悲观主义者、尤其是气候变化悲观主义者来说，大祸将会降临。可以肯定的是，我们面前的挑战非常艰巨。

以下是这份新报告的诸多亮点。

首先，如果各国政府坚持目前的政策——IEA把这种情况叫做“参考情景”(reference scenario)——那么，2030年的全球能源需求将比今天高50%以上，其中74%的增量来自发展中国家，仅中印两国就将占45%。

第二，即使全球生产总值的能源密集度(energy intensity)以每年1.8%的速度下降，总需求还是会出现这种巨大增长。

第三，在2005年到2030年之间的全球能耗增量中，预计化石燃料将占84%。

第四，IEA坚持认为，在每桶60美元附近（以2006年的美元汇率计），全球石油资源足以满足需求。但是，石油输出国组织（OPEC，简称欧佩克）在全球供应中所占比例将从42%提高到52%。此外，“从现在到2015年，不排除出现供给危机及油价飞涨的可能。”

第五，由于煤炭在发电方面的重要作用，2005年到2030年间，预计煤炭在全球商业能源中所占份额将从25%升至28%。中国和印度的煤炭消费已经占到全球的45%，在“参考情景”下，全球煤炭消费增量的五分之四以上将来自这两个国家。

第六，供应基础设施方面将需要投资大约22万亿美元（接近2006年全球生产总值的一半），以满足未来25年的需求。

第七，在“可选择政策情景”(alternative policy scenario)下，就算采取激进措施降低经济增长的能源密集度，全球主要能源需求也会以每年1.3%的速度增长，仅比“参考情景”下减少0.5个百分点。

第八，2010年后不久，中国将超过美国，成为全球最大的能源消费国。

第九，在参考情景下，2005年至2030年间，二氧化碳排放将跃升57%。仅美国、中国、俄罗斯和印度四国就将在这一增幅中占三分之二。中国今年成为全球最大的排放国，而印度将在2015年之前成为第三大排放国。

第十，即便是在IEA更激进的“可选择政策情景”下，二氧化碳排放也只有到2025年才能趋于稳定，而届时的总排放量仍然会比2005年的水平高出近30%。

这样的话，全球其它地方就可以希望享受能源密集型生活方式了——迄今为止，这种生活方式还一直是全球不到六分之一人口的特权。不过，这种欲望会给全球经济、战略与环境前景带来严重后果。

显而易见的经济问题就是未来的价格。按照高收入国家出口产品的单位价值调整折算，如今的油价是20世纪以来的最高水平。除非能源供应出现重大技术突破，或者意外发现大量石油和天然气，不然的话，能源似乎还是会保持相对较昂贵水平。

然而，对很多人来说，20世纪80年代的一个惊喜就是，经过20世纪70年代的价格震荡之后，最终有大量供应源源不断出现，需求增长水平也非常低。这种调整还会再次发生吗？如果发生的话，会有多快呢？或者，我们是否应该认为，快速增长的巨型新兴经济体和国家能源供应商占主导地位这两个因素的结合，已经使得局面发生了根本的变化？

重大战略问题则是能源安全问题，以及权力天平倾向于不受欢迎的政体。这些政体有可能是弗拉基米尔•普京(Vladimir Putin)领导下的俄罗斯、乌戈•查韦斯(Hugo Chávez)领导下的委内瑞拉、马哈茂德•艾哈迈迪-内贾德(Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad)领导下的伊朗，也可能是沙特阿拉伯议会。

权力天平的倾斜有两个途径：第一，对于我们目前所认为的文明生活至关重要的燃料，将有越来越高的比例来自几个不一定友好的供应国；第二，这些国家变得越来越富。以此看来，2002年到今年，预计欧佩克的收入增长了两倍（当然，是以不断贬值的美元计算的）。

能源安全挑战的部分原因在于，石油作为运输燃料的作用很难被替代。如此一来，可能的供应就集中在中东地区，这就不可避免地成了一个问题。同理，欧洲日益依赖俄罗斯天然气也是这样。

对能源安全的担心，还来自于能源消费大国之间可能发生的供应争夺。理智的方法是依靠市场解决问题。但是价格暴涨时，就可能很难解决。到了一定的时候，美国政治家也许会问，美国为什么要付出鲜血与金钱，就为了在中东地区实现对中国有利的安全保障？真正的帝国主义（试图为了一己之利把持能源来源）将是一个可怕的错误。但犯错是人之常情。

最后，我们还有全球变暖问题。在这个问题上有三点说明。第一，尽管人们对此一直喋喋不休，但还没有采取什么有效措施，而且似乎也不太可能采取有效措施。第二，有效政策要求全球各国对鼓励机制作出重大改变，包括但不仅限于大型新兴经济体的鼓励机制。第三，还要出现巨大的技术变革，最重要的就是燃煤发电厂的“碳捕获和存储”(carbon-capture-and-storage)的技术。

底线是什么？很简单：商业能源是我们当代生活的支柱。随着能源需求的增长，最重要的莫过于确保供应增加和有效使用、同时限制环境破坏。今天的高油价只是一个开始。根本性的创新和温室气体排放的高代价必须紧紧跟上。

译者/徐柳